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Resumen. ¿Es David Lewis realmente un realista?
Paradoxically, concerning the structure of  the world, David Lewis endorses a very nominalistic 
point of  view, whereas he approaches possible worlds from an extreme realistic position. The aim 
of  the present paper is exactly to analyze the relation between the ontology of  actual world and 
the possible worlds ontology in the case of  David Lewis, and to see whether or not this tension 
between the two irreconcilable positions is based on an inner contradiction in his philosophy.
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the possible worlds ontology in the case of  David Lewis, and to see whether or not this tension 
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In assessing David Lewis’ ontology, one seems to be trapped in the following dilemma: on 
one hand, he holds a nominalistic position regarding the structure of  the world, and, on the 
other hand, he is well-known for endorsing a realistic position concerning possible worlds. 
Lewis says explicitly: “That ontology, though Nominalistic, is in other respects generous. 
It consists of  possibilia – particular, individual things, some of  which comprise our actual 
world and others of  which are unactualized - together with the iterative hierarchy of  
classes built up from them. Thus, I already have at my disposal a theory of  properties as 
classes of  possibilia” (Lewis 1983, p. 209). Thus, in order to understand his point of  view 
concerning what there is, we have to see what these possibilia comprised in various possible 
worlds are, and, consequently, how he understands properties as classes of  possibilia. But 
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let’s postpone for a while the discussion concerning his nominalism, and let’s see now what 
he means by possible worlds, and, after that, by properties as classes. 
Possible Worlds
Lewis’ account of  possible worlds could be characterize as holding four main tenets:
1. Modal Realism. David Lewis’ (modal) realism concerning possible worlds is a defence 
of  the view that possible worlds and their contents are all equally real; he takes these 
worlds to be primitives and insists that his realistic interpretation of  possibilia is merely a 
formalization of  our common-sense thinking about modality:  “I believe that there are 
possible worlds other than the one we happen to inhabit. If  an argument is wanted, it is 
this. It is uncontroversially true that things might be otherwise than they are. I believe, and 
so do you, that things could have been different in countless ways. (...) I therefore believe 
in the existence of  entities that might be called “ways things could have been. I prefer to 
call them possible worlds” (Lewis 1979, p.182).
2. As a direct consequence of  his extreme Realism is his well-known doctrine of  the 
Indexical Theory of  Actuality: “Our actual world is only one world among others. We call it 
alone actual not because it differs in kind from all the rest but because it is the world we 
inhabit. The inhabitants of  other worlds may truly call their own worlds actual, if  they 
mean by actual what we do. (...) Actual is indexical like ‘I’ or ‘here’ or ‘now’: it depends for 
its reference on the circumstances of  utterance, to wit the world where the utterance is 
located” (Lewis 1979, p.184).
3. A third main idea of  Lewis’ concerning modality is his Counterpart Theory. There is no 
more identity through individuals, but, as a substitute between very similar individuals, 
we have the counterpart relation, based of  the likeness of  the individuals. “In general: 
something has for counterparts at a given world those things existing there that resemble 
it closely enough in important respects of  intrinsic quality and extrinsic relations, and 
resemble it no less closely than no other things existing there. Ordinarily something 
will have one counterpart or none at a world, but ties in similarity may give it multiple 
counterparts. (...) the counterpart relation ought to be used as a substitute for transworld 
identity in explaining de re modality” (Lewis 1979a, p.126).
4. As a direct consequence of  that, is his Theory of  Worldbound Individuals, which states 
that an individual could exist in only one world, and no other identical individual is to be 
found in that or another world.  Thus, his account concerning possible worlds could be 
summarized as holding three main claims: the existence of  a plenitude of  real possible 
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worlds, each world might be seen as actual, and an individual is bound to a singular world.
Properties & Classes
Something must be said now about the role of  classes in metaphysics1. Due to the axiom 
of  extension we have it that two sets are equal if  and only if  they have the same elements. 
This provides a good extensional criterion for the identity of  sets. So, even though these 
are abstract objects, they could be, if  not entirely accepted, at least not rejected by a 
Nominalist. Accepting classes and reducing properties to classes have as effect what is 
called Class Nominalism, position endorsed by David Lewis. As Armstrong observes: “One 
attraction of  Class Nominalism is that the theory of  classes is well developed, which is not 
the case for the theory of  properties. Quine says that the identity-conditions for classes 
are “crystal-clear”, while the identity-conditions for properties are “obscure” (Armstrong 
1978, vol. I, p. 29). That’s why Lewis is entitled to maintain that: “To have a property is 
to be a member of  a class” (Lewis, 1983, p. 210). Therefore, in this case of  reductionism, 
to have a property F is reduced to the fact of  being member of  a certain class of  things, 
namely the class of  Fs2.
	 But,	since	in	the	world	we	can	find	not	only	one-place	predicates	like	properties,	but	
also more-place predicates, like relations, how could one accommodate in a Nominalistic 
theory ontological facts as relations. Technically speaking, there are no problems in this 
case, just because formally a relation, an ordered pair of  objects, could be reduced to an 
unordered class of  unordered classes3.
 Observing now that we have used both ‘set’ and ‘class’, we can ask, if  there is any 
difference between the two notions, and what this difference is about. What he means 
by these two notions, and also if  he makes a difference at all between them, it cannot be 
explicitly	find,	for	instance,	in	his	paper	New Work for a Theory of  Universals, where he tackles 
explicitly this point. Here, according to Lewis’ account of  classes, one could observe that 
he did not draw the distinctions from the standard set theory, postulating, beside relations 
as ‘to be a member of ’ or ‘to be included in’, elements like: ‘individuals’ (which are the 
elements on the bottom of  this logical hierarchy, having as ontological correspondents 
the particulars), ‘sets’ and ‘classes’. The distinction between sets and classes is important. 
1  In his book “Parts of Classes” Lewis argues that set theory in turn reduces, with the aid of 
mereology, to the theory of singleton functions. But, as long, as numbers could be also reduced to sets, it 
seems that Lewis, with regard to the traditional mathematical objects like numbers and sets, is embracing 
a Nominalistic positions concerning the status of mathematical objects.
2  �s are not only actual objects, but also possible objects. �he class includes all �s from all pos�
sible worlds.
3  In the case of relations, we can reduce the ordered pair <a,b> to an unordered class of unordered 
classes: a, a,b
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Intuitively,	 one	might	 think	 any	predicate	determines	 a	fixed	 set,	 namely	 the	 set	of 	 all	
things satisfying that predicate. It turns out, however, that this is an incoherent idea, as 
appears for instance in Russell’s paradox. Some predicates have an extension that is just 
too “large” to be considered a set. Examples are things like: being a set, being a set which 
is not a member of  itself, being an ordinal number, being a cardinal number, having exactly 
one element. The list can go on. However, we still like to speak of  the collection of  things 
determined by a predicate, and we call this the extension of  the predicate. A class is the 
extension of  some predicates. Most of  the familiar operations used in mathematics do 
not lead to classes, which are too large, and so do not cause any problem. It is now the 
practice in mathematics to distinguish between small classes, called sets, and large classes, 
called proper classes. For example “the class of  all classes which does not include itself  as a 
member” is not a set, being a proper class. In fact, it is not a well-founded set, as long as it 
generates a paradox in the standard set theory. In conclusion, sets are classes being capable 
of  being members.
An odd consequence of  Lewis’ account of  properties reduced to classes, since he does 
not draw a distinction between sets and classes, is that one could easily obtain such 
strange properties like the “property of  all properties that are not themselves properties”. 
However, later, in his book concerning possible worlds, Lewis seems to be aware of  this 
difficulty	and	its	consequences4.
Universals & Properties
Let’s focus now on the postponed problem of  the status of  universals in Lewis’s ontology. 
As	we	have	already	seen	Lewis	tries	to	see	what	benefits	there	are	by	adding	universal	to	
his Nominalistic ontology. The starting point is Armstrong’s Theory of  Universals. After 
discussing this position he provides his own account to the topic, seeing in turn what 
advantages would have someone tackling various controversial ontological issues from this 
point of  view. The main idea of  the whole account is the distinction between properties 
and universals.
 Armstrong does not provide any distinction between properties and universals, on 
the contrary, he endorsed the classical view, where by ‘universals’ we understand in fact 
properties and/or relations:  
-“I will restrict myself  to monadic universals or properties and afterwards make some 
brief  remarks about what has been said to polyadic universals or relations” (Armstrong 
(1978), vol. II, p. 43). 
-“Every property is a monadic property” (Armstrong (1978), vol. II, p. 61). 
-“ Particulars have properties and stand in relations. But do these properties and relations 
4  See Lewis (1986), p. 50, note 37.
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in turn have their own properties and relations? More succinctly: ‘Are there second-order 
universal?’”. (Armstrong (1978), vol. II, p. 133).
 In this light, it is unclear what Lewis means by saying that properties and universals 
are two different things. A possible answer is that, as we have already seen, properties are 
reduced to classes, and having a property means to be member of  a certain class. Properties 
seem to raise no more problems for a Nominalist, unlike the status of  universals, which 
still remain a controversial ontological issue. 
 Another problem with regard to such reduction is the existence of  different coextensive 
properties like “having a kidney” and “having a heart”. Dealing with these properties in 
the fashion of  the Class Nominalism, we will obtain a single class of  actual individuals, 
which, in fact, stands for two distinct properties. But in this case it is not clear what exactly 
is the class. The way out, in Lewis case, is his theory of  possible worlds. His response 
would be that these properties are coextensive only in this world, and, provided that, it 
is a contingent fact that properties are coextensive. There are other possible worlds where 
individuals that have livers, may not have hearts, or vice versa. Thus properties, as classes 
of  possibilia, range over every possible world, not only over our world. Therefore, Lewis’ 
theory of  possible worlds offers a good account for understanding his view on what there 
is in and outside a world5. 
 But, as Armstrong pointed out, Lewis would still be in trouble if  there are cases where 
two distinct properties are necessarily coextensive, because what is necessary holds in all 
possible worlds. The obvious reply would be to argue that in such cases the necessary 
connection shows that the supposed two properties are really one. But this reply may 
run	into	difficulty.	Elliot	Sober,	for	 instance,	has	argued	that	the	properties	of 	being	 ‘a	
three-sided	plane	figure’	and	‘being	a	three-angled	plane	figure’	(being	trilateral	and	being	
triangular) are distinct, but necessarily coextensive, properties.
 Let me present now a critical analysis of  Quine’s extensional account of  classes. 
Armstrong’s critique may also apply to Lewis’ account of  properties of  classes6. “A class, 
as Quine says, is determined by its members. Change its members and it is automatically 
a different class. Consider then the view that to be an electron, say, is to be a member of  
the class of  electrons. These electrons are contingent beings. That is to say, some of  them 
might not have existed. Other electrons besides the ones that exist might have existed. In 
that case, as Quine’s point indicates, we would have dealing with a different class. But given 
a class analysis of  what is to be an electron, a change in the membership of  the class entails 
5  It is clear now that his theory of possible world is not an additional or parallel account to his 
view concerning the structure of the world. In fact one needs the other, so they tend to be two different 
faces of the same coin. But then, moreover, the initial allegation concerning a possible hidden inner con�
tradiction should be elucidated.
6  Lewis was Quine’s student at Harvard, and he seems to be a kind of extensional reductionist 
also. He is following his professor very closely.
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that the type being an electron would have been different. This is a clear consequence of  the 
class analysis. But is this an acceptable consequence? It seems not. Intuitively, given these 
changes in the class membership, being an electron would not have been, certainly need not 
have been, any different. Electron nature is independent of  electron class” (Armstrong 
1989, p. 27).
	 Further,	Armstrong	remarks	that	Lewis	has	a	way	out	of 	this	difficulty,	endorsing	his	
theory of  possible worlds:  “David Lewis can escape this consequence, though at the cost 
of  postulating all those possible worlds. His natural class of  electrons is the class that has 
as members all the electrons in all the possible worlds. This class could not be other than it 
is. Every possibility for electrons is exhausted” (Armstrong 1989, p. 27). Thus, once again 
Lewis needs possible worlds in order to secure his nominalistic account of  properties as 
classes.
 Let see now why universals and properties are distinct entities in Lewis’s case. Lewis 
maintains	that:	“Universals	and	properties	differ	in	two	principal	ways.	The	first	difference	
concerns their instantiation. A universal is supposed to be wholly present wherever it is 
instantiated. It is constituent part (though not a spatio-temporal part) of  each particular 
that has it. A property, by contrast, is spread around. The property of  being a donkey 
is partly present wherever there is a donkey, in this or any other world” (Lewis 1983, p. 
210).
 This is another point of  divergence between Lewis and Armstrong, since the latter 
says: “Consider the old dilemma. Given different things with the same property, then the 
property must be either partially or wholly present in the things. If  partially, then the unity 
of  the property is destroyed. But if  wholly in each, how can it be in either? (...) If  we are 
forced to take one horn of  this dilemma, then I think it is clear that we should take the 
second. If  two things have the very same property, then that property is, in some sense, ‘in’ 
each of  them. But this does not mean that properties of  a thing are separate constituents 
of  the thing” (Lewis 1983, p. 210). Lewis’ view is quite unintuitive and unnatural. Consider 
further how strange it is to say something like “the donkey is a member of  the property”. 
It is true that we can reduce “to be a donkey” to the fact of  “ being a member of  the 
donkey class”, but it is still hard to say that the donkey belongs to the property and not vice 
versa, i.e., the property belongs to the donkey. 
 Providing some examples, Lewis holds a bizarre thing, namely that notions like 
“round”, “silver”, “gold” count as universals. But as long as I have the class of  donkeys, I 
can also have the class of  the round objects, of  silver objects, of  gold objects and so on. 
But where is then the difference between universals and properties? It seems that in fact 
what traditionally count as universals, namely (like the above mentioned) properties, is 
seen by Lewis as being universal, and, whenever we have particular individuals, the classes 
constructed on the basis of  these particulars, provide us with properties. 
 A second difference between properties and universals concerns their abundance. 
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This seems to be a very interesting and important feature, since Lewis says: “This is the 
difference	that	qualifies	them	for	different	work,	and	thereby	gives	rise	to	my	interest	in	
having universal and properties both” (Lewis 1983, p. 210). But this is even more vague 
and unclear. Why and how are universals sparse? No argument is provided in supporting 
this intuition, only a kind of  ontological assumption: “The guiding idea, roughly is that the 
world’s universals should comprise a minimal basis for characterizing the world completely” 
(Lewis 1983, p. 210).
 On the other hand, that’s true. The abundance of  properties is immense, since they 
include all possible classes of  all possible entities.  But “because properties are so abundant, 
they	are	undiscriminating.	Any	two	things	share	infinitely	many	properties,	and	fail	to	share	
infinitely	many	others”	 (Lewis	 1983,	 p.	 210).	This	 fact	 has	 an	 important	 consequence,	
namely the failure of  properties to capture the resemblance and the causal power of  the 
things. In order to have that we need an “elite minority of  special properties”, and the 
universal could serve to pick up these special properties, called natural properties.  As long 
as every class generates a property, and the majority of  classes are built up randomly from 
various different actual and possible things, it is hard to work with this kind of  objects. 
Subsets of  those classes would be natural properties, namely classes of  objects that have 
something in common. It is quite different to have something like the class of  all human 
being, or chairs, or books or whatever we have in a particular classroom, from having a 
class like “all the items in that classroom”. 
	 Lewis’	definition	for	natural	properties	is:	“Natural	properties	would	be	the	ones	whose	
sharing makes for resemblance and the ones relevant to causal powers. Most simply, we 
could call a property perfectly natural, if  its members are all and only those things that 
share some one universal. There are two purely Nominalistic alternatives to this account in 
which the universal have the special job of  drawing the line between natural and unnatural 
properties. One alternative is to draw primitive distinctions among particulars, instead 
of  employing universals; in this account the predicate “natural” is token primitive, and 
no	further	analysis	of 	the	term	will	be	provided.	Another	alternative	is	to	define	natural	
properties in terms of  mutual resemblance of  their members; the result will be a “daunting 
price	in	complexity	artificiality	of 	our	primitive”	(Lewis	1983,	p.	211).
 Thus, the universals will be accepted in Lewis’ system in order to provide the difference 
between natural and unnatural properties, and also because universals are irreducible to 
properties, even they could be somehow regarded as a special subset of  properties. On the 
other hand for Lewis, also properties are irreducible to universals, especially because they 
are indispensable in semantic contexts.
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Nominalism vs. Realism
Here is a crucial point of  our analysis. We have on one hand the Nominalistic position 
concerning the structure of  the world, plus the role of  universals in this structure, and, on 
the other hand, the Realistic account of  possible worlds. Since he uses universals, an easy 
way would be to dismiss his position as being Nominalistic and to solve the initial dilemma 
by saying that he is ‘really’ a Realist. Two things still stand against this way of  interpreting 
him.	The	first	thing	is	that	his	‘use’	of 	universals	is	not	ontological,	but	methodological.	
For Lewis, universals play not a constitutive role in the construction of  the world, but an 
explanatory role of  how could we acquire natural properties. A theory which uses universals 
is not necessarily a Nominalistic theory, as long as they are not cast in playing an active 
role on the scene, but only as explaining to the public what is going on on the stage. A 
second thing is his implicit intention to reduce entities in a very strict extensional way. This 
means that, even he is maybe not a Nominalist avant la lettre,	he	is	a	definite	one	in	spirit:	
“An adequate Nominalism, of  course, is a theory that takes Moorean facts of  apparent 
sameness of  type as primitive. It predicates mutual resemblance of  the things which are 
apparently of  the same type: or it predicates naturalness of  some property that all they 
share, i.e. that has them all as members; and it declines to analyze these predications any 
further. That is why the problem of  One over Many, rightly understood, does not provide 
more than a prima facie reason to postulate universals. Universals afford one solution, but 
there are others“ (Lewis 1983, p. 214).
 The moral of  Lewis’ story could be that we do not have any compelling ontological 
arguments to force someone to accept the existence of  the universals, but we can 
accommodate such entities in our theories due to methodological reasons, in order to 
provide better and simpler explanations. “The work I have in store for an adequately 
discriminatory theory of  properties might be new work for a theory of  universals, or it 
might instead be work for the resources of  an adequate Nominalism” (Lewis 1983, p. 
215).
	 It	seems	now	that	the	only	way	left,	due	to	the	dismissal	of 	the	first	variant,	is	to	interpret	
him as a true Nominalist. But that means that we have to see him as a real Nominalist also 
with regard to the existence of  possible worlds. Let’s see what features of  his philosophy 
could support this way of  understanding his doctrine. Obviously, if  someone wants to 
maintain something like that, he must face the fact that, concerning possible world, David 
Lewis is an autoproclaimed ‘modal realist’. In fact, David Lewis is better known from this 
perspective than he is known as maintaining a Nominalistic position with regard to the 
ontological status of  universals.
I advocate the thesis of plurality of worlds, or modal realism, which holds that our world is 
but one among many. �here are countless other worlds, other very inclusive things. Our world 
consists of us and all our surroundings, however remote in time and space. (Lewis 1986, p. 
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2).
Modal Realism & Essentialism
The	problem	now	is	to	see	whether	or	not	the	‘realism’	 label	fits	correctly	Lewis’	view.	
As we have seen, he holds the existence of  a plenitude of  possible worlds, each being as 
real as the other. But, by this thesis, it is not clear if  he endorses a realistic position, like 
the classical one: the acceptance of  the universals as truly ontological ingredients of  the 
world. On the contrary, he claims that all these possible worlds have, in fact, a very simple 
Nominalistic structure. So, his view is that there are countless many worlds, including 
ours, and they do not include the existence of  the universals. There is no incompatibility 
between the two theses: Nominalism and the existence of  other possible worlds. The 
result of  combining them would be, in turn, the existence of  a multitude of  Nominalistic 
possible worlds. The view is both Nominalistic and coherent.
 But then, it is interesting to see why this name ‘modal realism’.  It seems to be so, just 
because the idea of  possible worlds is captured by the ‘semantics of  possible worlds’, 
which is in fact a technical interpretation of  modal logic. Modal logic represents different 
systems of  classical logic, plus the modal operators like ‘it is necessary/possible that…’. 
Therefore, in order to be a real ‘modal realist’, someone has to believe in the existence of  
modality as such. That means one has to be convinced by the fact that our world has a 
modal structure, namely that there are de re, modal properties comprised in the structure 
of  world. The acceptance of  de re properties and/or propositions is the hallmark of  a 
modal realist. That means that modality is a characteristic of  the world, and not of  our 
language about the world, like in the acceptance of  the de dicto modalities.
 This is a crucial point of  our discussion, namely the possible characterization of  a 
doctrine as truly being modal realism in concordance with the fact whether or not this 
doctrine accepts de re properties, namely essences. I am holding that precisely this acceptance 
of  the essences is the real test of  whether or not a theory could be characterized as ‘modal 
realism’. There are two main types of  essences: general essences (quidditas) and individual 
essences (haecceitas).  Dawid Lewis rejects both of  them.
 In fact he is rejecting the more general problem of  trans-world identity. Since we could 
not talk of  an individual as being in more that one world, we could not say that there are 
essences. And it is obvious that in Lewis’ case, where an individual is bound to only one 
possible world (see Lewis’ fourth thesis), all the properties of  an individual are essential to 
him. This is what sometime is called superessentialism. But this position, in the spite of  his 
name, is different from a classical (Aristotelian) essentialism, where there are both essential 
and accidental properties. Similar as in the case of  his superessentialism, which is not a 
true version of  essentialism, Lewis’ extreme modal realism is not actually modal realism.
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His	Counterpart	Theory	 is	 a	 substitute	 for	Quantified	Modal	Logic.	With	 the	help	 of 	
this theory, one could get rid of  modal discourse in the favor of  an extensional account 
of  possible worlds. Again, his aim is to reduce, and, thus, to eliminate, modal concepts. 
Instead of  an intensional modal logic, one will obtain, in exchange, an extensional system, 
based on individuals and sets of  individuals.
 Lewis’ rejection of  intensional items is a natural continuation of  his Quinean inheritance. 
Quine casts off  from logic and ontology all intentional entities. His discussions concerning 
the	quantification	 into	modal	 (oblique)	contexts	and,	consequently,	his	 rejection	of 	 the	
essentialism,	 are	well-known.	Lewis	makes	 a	 step	 further.	He	provides	 for	 both	fields,	
logic and ontology, coherent theories. These theories are in fact alternative extensional 
accounts of  modal logic and possible worlds semantics. They are unproblematic for a 
Nominalist, getting rid of  any intensional traces. There are no more intensional remains 
here. Everything is clear. No universals or old fashion properties. We have only individuals 
and classes of  individuals. They constitute the world, in fact all the worlds.
Many wonder why Lewis thinks that, given the existence of  all these ‘worlds’, they have 
anything to do with modality. They have in fact nothing to do with modality. Lewis said 
that they are ‘ways things could have been’. But we have not access to them, and therefore, 
we cannot say anything about them. Since the worlds do not share a common modal 
structure, and they are beyond our accessibility, we may not say anything about them. 
 In conclusion, Lewis extends Quine’s line of  thought, rejecting any appeal to intensional 
entities. He tries explicitly in various occasions to reduce everything to extensional entities. 
But this is a mark of  Nominalism, and the heel of  Achilles’ heal is his rejection of  
essences.  He cannot pass this test. A distinctive and common feature of  modal realists is 
the acceptance of  the modal structure of  the world. Since he rejects essences, namely the 
modal structure of  the world, he fails to be a modal realist. Otherwise it would be hard to 
see what a ‘modal realist’ really is.
 Summing up, the result is that Lewis’ Realism is a hidden Nominalist, and his account 
of  possible worlds is, in fact, a kind of  Trojan‘s horse of  Nominalism in the fortress of  
Realists. Paraphrasing Lewis’ description of  his worlds: “possible worlds are like remote 
planets; except that most of  them are much bigger than mere planets, and they are not 
remote”, I conclude by saying that Lewis’ conception is like modal realism; except that in 
most part is Nominalistic, and that is not modal at all.
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